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For millennia, people have used narratives to inform and persuade.  However, little social 
psychological research addresses how and when narrative persuasion occurs, perhaps because 
narratives are complex stimuli that are difficult to vary without significantly changing the plot or 
characters.  Existing research suggests that regulatory fit and/or processing fluency can be varied 
easily and in ways completely exterior to narrative content but that nonetheless affect how much 
narratives engage, transport, and persuade.  We review research on narrative transportation and 
persuasion and then discuss regulatory fit and its relationship to processing fluency.  Afterward, 
we discuss how regulatory fit and processing fluency may affect psychological engagement, 
transportation, and persuasion via narratives. 





Regulatory Fit, Processing Fluency, and Narrative Persuasion 
Many people have experienced the power of narratives.  Some believe that narratives can 
persuade in a positive way, such as parents who read their children Aesop’s fables.  Others 
believe that narratives can negatively persuade, such as those who try to ban certain books from 
public libraries.  Persuasive narratives certainly are not limited to those in books.  For example, 
in May, 2010, when the 8-year run of the TV show “24” ended, numerous journalists wrote 
about how the show had affected viewers’ beliefs about the effectiveness of torture.  On the 
show, the main character often saved the US by using torture to extract information from 
terrorists.  Some journalists noted that the “show had a huge influence on the debate over torture, 
with several conservatives, including Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, citing the show’s 
vivid depictions of ‘ticking time bomb’ scenarios” (The Week, June 11, 2010, p. 21).  Several 
years earlier, Mayer (2007, 2008) had reported evidence that “24” was promoting unethical and 
illegal behavior among young American interrogators and soldiers.  To the dismay of 
experienced military and FBI interrogators, these young personnel believed they were acting 
appropriately, given what they saw on the show each week (Mayer, 2007). 
Persuasion via narratives is a timeless phenomenon; Aesop used fables, the Buddha and 
Jesus used parables, and Aristotle (330 BCE/1987) wrote about the importance of poetry (as 
fictional narrative) for imitation and learning.  It is perhaps surprising, then, that more research in 
social psychology has not addressed how narratives can impact attitudes and beliefs.  Part of the 
difficulty may be in varying psychological involvement or engagement with narratives without 
profoundly affecting their contents.  Narratives are complex stimuli that are difficult to 
manipulate while maintaining the integrity of the plot and characters (Green, 2008).  We describe 
research on a source of engagement that can affect the processing of narratives even when the 
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source is not the narrative itself. It is regulatory fit/nonfit, the experience of doing something in a 
way that fits or does not fit one’s orientation to a goal (e.g., Higgins, 2009). This experience can 
come from an initial event exterior to a focal task (e.g., Cesario, Grant & Higgins, 2004). 
To experience what regulatory fit and nonfit are like, you can try this.  First think of 
something you ideally would like to gain.  (For example, you might like to see one of your old 
friends more often.)  Now think of five ways to avoid anything that could go wrong as you try to 
accomplish this goal (e.g., don’t let weeks go by without calling, don’t skimp on money for air 
fare…).  As you bring these five strategies to mind, how engaged do you feel?  If our guess is 
right, your answer is something like, “Not very.”  Now you can try this: think of five ways to 
make sure everything goes right as you try to accomplish this goal (e.g., call them this week, 
start saving money for air fare…).  Our guess is that you feel more engaged this time.  If so, 
you’ve just experienced the difference between regulatory nonfit (with the first set of strategies) 
and regulatory fit (with the second; this procedure is from Vaughn, Harkness & Clark, 2010; also 
see Freitas & Higgins, 2002).  We will describe regulatory fit in more detail shortly.  For now, it 
is enough to say that compared to regulatory nonfit, regulatory fit can enhance engagement with 
any activity or idea that happens to be in mind at the time, including later activities or ideas that 
did not cause the regulatory fit/nonfit experience (e.g., Higgins, 2009).  
In this paper, we begin by discussing narratives: what they are, how people can process 
them, how narratives may persuade, and challenges in varying narrative persuasion.  Then we 
introduce our regulatory fit and processing fluency approach to studying narrative processing and 
persuasion, describing what regulatory fit is (using fit with promotion and prevention 
orientations as our main example), how regulatory fit relates to processing fluency (the 
subjective ease of processing information), how feelings associated with regulatory fit and 
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processing fluency may enhance engagement with whatever else happens to be in mind, and 
summarizing evidence that regulatory fit can enhance narrative persuasion.  Finally, we suggest 
how this approach could be extended in various ways: to different types of regulatory fit, to other 
sources of processing fluency, and to situations where regulatory fit or processing fluency could 
reduce rather than enhance narrative persuasion. 
Narratives 
A narrative can be defined in many ways. In a sense, it is just a story with “an identifiable 
beginning, middle, and end that provides information about the scene, characters, and conflict; 
raises unanswered questions or unresolved conflict; and provides resolution” (Hinyard & 
Kreuter, 2007, p. 778).  Another kind of definition focuses more on the content that supports 
unique aspects of narrative processing (Mar & Oatley, 2008): a narrative is a somewhat-abstract 
model of part of the social world, a model designed to transport the audience through a mental 
simulation of what it is like to be in the mind of a character who is experiencing complex 
thoughts, feelings, goals and intentions in relation to other characters (Mar & Oatley, 2008).  
What would it be like to love your dog as your best friend but be trapped with him on an iceberg 
and have to contemplate killing him for food – and know that your dog is probably feeling and 
contemplating the same about you (as in “Two Were Left”; H. B. Cave, in Berger, 1956)?  What 
would it be like to be injured and likely to die alone in the wilderness without the person you 
love the most knowing how you feel about him or her (as in “Crossing Spider Creek”; D. 
O’Brien, in Thomas, Thomas & Hazuka, 1992)?  To clarify the human intentions of characters 
engaged in these and other storylines, authors carefully incorporate only the details they consider 
important (Mar & Oatley, 2008).  Thus, although many narratives have highly complex 
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storylines and character experiences (e.g., the TV show, “24”), stimuli in a narrative are still 
somewhat simpler and more abstract than real-world social stimuli (Mar & Oatley, 2008).  
The abstractness of narratives compared to real social life may help explain why 
narratives are so transporting: “We have to project ourselves into a story world in order to 
understand what the characters are thinking and feeling” (Mar & Oatley, 2008, p. 178).  
Transportation is defined as the process of becoming emotionally and cognitively immersed in a 
narrative, in which we lose track of the real world as the story-guided mental simulation of the 
story events unfolds (Gerrig, 1993; Green & Brock, 2000).  It is a highly-engaged, flow-like state 
of absorption in the story (cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), in which 
people devote nearly complete conscious attention to constructing emotional and cognitive 
meaning from story events (e.g., Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008).  This often occurs with the help of 
narrative-prompted autobiographical memories (Dunlop, Wakefield & Kashima, 2010; Mar & 
Oatley, 2008).  The Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 2000), which we have used in each of 
our narratives studies, measures this experience.  It contains items about ease of imagining story 
events, emotional involvement, attention to the story, feelings of suspense, unawareness of one’s 
surroundings, and vividness of mental imagery.  
Many models of narrative impact posit that transportation is a key factor in narrative 
persuasion (e.g., Dal Cin, Zanna & Fong, 2004; Green & Brock, 2002; Moyer-Guse, 2008; Slater 
& Rouner, 2002).  Studies often show a positive relationship between transportation and 
subsequent story-consistent attitudes and beliefs (e.g., Dunlop et al., 2010; Escalas, 2004, 2007; 
Green, 2004; Green & Brock, 2000; Vaughn, Hesse, Petkova & Trudeau, 2009; Wang & Calder, 
2006, 2009; though see Moyer-Guse & Nabi, 2010).  There are various ways transportation 
could result in narrative persuasion.  Narrative transportation is an enjoyable state people are 
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motivated to continue (Green, Brock & Kaufman, 2004), and it takes active participation of the 
target audience, leaving less attention than usual for critically evaluating information (e.g., Green 
& Brock 2000, 2002). Together, these processes could reduce motivation and ability to argue 
against persuasive subtexts in the narrative (e.g., Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Dal Cin et al., 
2004; Green & Brock, 2000, 2002; Moyer-Guse, 2008; Slater & Rouner, 2002).  Additionally, 
transportation is positively related to psychological involvement with characters (e.g., Moyer-
Guse & Nabi, 2010), which itself could contribute to persuasion via narratives (e.g., Bandura, 
2004; Cohen, 2001; Dal Cin et al., 2004; Moyer-Guse, 2008; Moyer-Guse & Nabi, 2010; Slater, 
2002; Slater & Rouner, 2002; Sood, 2002).  Moreover, the structures of narratives that aid in 
transportation (such as plotlines about not-entirely-predictable social interactions) often result in 
implicitly persuasive subtexts rather than in explicitly persuasive statements, which means that 
there are often no specific arguments to refute within the narrative (e.g., Slater & Rouner, 2002, 
Dal Cin et al., 2004; Moyer-Guse, 2008).  
If transportation is crucial to persuasion via narratives, then developing methods to vary 
narrative transportation (as well as other aspects of narrative involvement) is important to 
moving research forward on how and when narratives can persuade.  Yet these methods have 
remained somewhat elusive.  Sometimes varying prereading instructions (e.g., to relax and read 
the narrative vs. to focus on the writing style and reading level) has affected transportation and 
persuasion (Green & Brock, 2000, Study 4) and sometimes it has not (Green & Brock, 2000, 
Studies 2 & 3; Green, 2004).  Experimentally varying fact versus fiction labeling of narratives 
does not affect transportation (Green & Brock, 2000) or persuasion via narratives (Green & 
Brock, 2000; Strange & Leung, 1999).  Other research has shown that people randomly assigned 
to receive information in narrative form rather than as a list of statements can be more 
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transported and persuaded (e.g., Dunlop et al., 2010; Escalas, 2004, 2007; Moyer-Guse & Nabi, 
2010; though see Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007).  However, many differences exist between these 
forms of communication, which makes it hard to use this approach to pinpoint what makes 
narratives persuasive.   
Regulatory Fit and Processing Fluency Approach 
If we approach varying narrative transportation and persuasion from the perspective of 
how to vary engagement itself, it opens another way forward.  Our regulatory fit and processing 
fluency approach to studying how narratives engage and persuade is based on two simple ideas: 
(1) transportation is important to narrative persuasion, and (2) it is possible to vary transportation 
without varying the story.  To get a sense of how this could occur in the real world, imagine 
someone named Sally who is reading The Da Vinci Code (Brown, 2003).  Actually, it is not so 
much like reading; when she is into the book, she feels so close to the events and main characters 
that it’s almost like the events of the narrative are happening to her.  Although she often is not 
conscious of this as she reads, the insights she gains into the intentions of the characters and 
events in the story world feel intuitively engrossing and right.  Sally also now understands why 
so many conservative Christians were upset about the book and why so many people have 
written books debunking the conspiracy it portrayed.  Everything in the book seems so plausible. 
But about two-thirds of the way through, something changes.  She can’t figure out exactly what 
about the book is different, but she is more aware of herself and her surroundings as she reads, 
second-guesses what she imagines, and finds it harder to immerse herself in the story.  As 
narrators of this story, we can tell you that the book’s effectiveness isn’t what has changed.  
Sally has just started a new project at work that requires taking more risks than she usually 
prefers.  This lack of fit between Sally’s normal way of thinking about goals (as ways to ensure 
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security) and the ways she needs to think about pursuing goals in her new project (Be eager!  
Take risks!  Think outside the box!) creates a vague, uncomfortable lack of ease that doesn’t 
quite feel right.  It lingers beyond the time she is consciously aware of it and – in part because it 
is still there as she reads The Da Vinci Code - she attributes it to the story. 
We have not varied fit exactly like this in our research, but this example is consistent 
with our thinking and findings about how regulatory fit and processing fluency (i.e., processing 
ease) can affect transportation and persuasion via narratives.  As we mentioned earlier, 
regulatory fit occurs when someone’s way of thinking about a goal is consistent with how he or 
she is thinking about pursuing it.  Our research on regulatory fit has focused on the fit between 
promotion (vs. prevention) self-regulatory orientations toward goals and eager (vs. vigilant) 
ways of pursuing them, so we will summarize what regulatory focus theory says about them.  
According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998; for reviews see Forster & Werth, 
2009; Higgins & Spiegel, 2004; Higgins & Molden, 2003; Molden, Lee & Higgins, 2007), 
people in a promotion focus tend to think about goals in terms of opportunities for self-
realization.  People in this focus are especially sensitive to gains and nongains (e.g., successfully 
gaining versus not gaining more time with old friends). Eager strategies (e.g., making sure 
everything goes right) are a good fit for their desire not to miss anything good.  (When we first 
asked you to imagine what regulatory fit and nonfit are like, it was fit and nonfit with promotion 
focus.)  According to regulatory focus theory, people in a prevention focus tend to think about 
goals in terms of opportunities for security and protection.  People in this focus are especially 
sensitive to losses and nonlosses (e.g., losing versus successfully not losing touch with old 
friends). Vigilant strategies (e.g., making sure nothing goes wrong) are a good fit for their desire 
to not make mistakes.  (Sally experienced nonfit with prevention focus.)  A promotion or 
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prevention focus can be activated by a current situation (as when we asked you to think about 
something you ideally would like to gain or improve on), and it can become chronically 
accessible if activated enough.  (Sally tends to experience prevention more strongly.)  Situational 
and dispositional variations in regulatory focus have the same effects on thoughts, feelings, and 
behavior (Higgins, 1999).  Accordingly, fit can occur with either situational or dispositional 
regulatory focus.  
Regulatory fit results in greater processing fluency than regulatory nonfit (Lee & Aaker, 
2004; Vaughn, 2010); it is easier to process information in a way that fits your current regulatory 
focus than in a way that doesn’t.  Fit with promotion and prevention orientations also produces a 
variety of responses associated with processing fluency (for reviews of processing-fluency 
research, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Reber, Schwarz & Winkielman, 2004).  These include 
feelings of pleasantness (Higgins et al., 2003), enjoyment (Freitas & Higgins, 2002), confidence 
(Cesario et al., 2004), and rightness or correctness (e.g., Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003; 
Cesario et al., 2004; Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Freitas, Liberman, & 
Higgins, 2002; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel & Molden, 2003; Vaughn et al., 2010; Vaughn et 
al., 2009; Vaughn, Malik, Schwartz, Petkova & Trudeau, 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006).  
It is not clear when processing fluency from regulatory fit precedes feeling right from regulatory 
fit or vice-versa (Higgins, 2009).  Regardless of the causal sequence in a specific situation, it 
appears that these experiences can affect a wide variety of judgments.  
Many kinds of feelings and phenomenal experiences – including regulatory fit and 
processing fluency - can affect judgments and task engagement through helping people answer 
the (often implicit) question, “How do I feel about this?” (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004; also see 
Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).  This is especially clear, for example, in regulatory-fit 
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experiments that set up an initial experience of regulatory fit/nonfit that affects participants’ later 
task engagement (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006).  People can be unclear 
about the source of their feelings, and if their current feelings seem relevant to what they are 
currently thinking about, they tend to assume their feelings are caused by what they have in mind 
(e.g., Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).  Asking people how right an initial regulatory-fit 
task made them feel eliminates regulatory-fit effects on later activities by clarifying that the 
initial event caused these feelings (Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn et al., 2010; Vaughn et al., 2009; 
Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006; also see Clore, 1992; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). 
Regulatory fit can enhance engagement strength (Higgins, 2006; Higgins & Scholer, 
2009) when people (implicitly) attribute feelings of regulatory fit to what they are currently 
doing or thinking.  In many cases, this enhancement may occur because people assume that a 
current activity, thought, or feeling is causing desirable experiences of rightness and/or fluency 
when, in fact, regulatory fit is causing these experiences.  This can occur even if a manipulation 
of regulatory fit is completely exterior to a focal task (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn et al., 
2010; Vaughn et al., 2009; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006).  If so, 
varying regulatory fit in an initial task could vary engagement in transportation with a later-
encountered narrative.  Remember Sally: when she read the last third of The Da Vinci Code, she 
did not feel entirely right or confident as she mentally simulated the story events and the 
intentions of characters and did not consider how events at work could be causing her to feel this 
way.  So to her, this lack of rightness, confidence, and fluency was caused by the story – 
otherwise, why would she be feeling this way when she read it?  Attributing this lack of rightness 
to the story kept her from becoming absorbed in it.  If numerous theories about narrative 
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persuasion are correct (Green & Brock, 2000, 2002; Moyer-Guse, 2008; Slater & Rouner, 2002) 
this reduced transportation could also reduce the likelihood of being persuaded.  
Our reasoning suggests that varying regulatory fit – even in a way that is exterior to a 
subsequently-presented narrative - could vary narrative transportation and persuasion.  Several 
experiments provide support for this hypothesis (Vaughn et al., 2009).  In one study, we 
manipulated regulatory fit in an initial task exterior to a narrative (similar to how we asked you 
to imagine regulatory fit/nonfit earlier, e.g., Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006) 
then randomly assigned participants to read one of two short stories, after which they completed 
the Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 2000).  Regardless of the story, participants were more 
transported when they had experienced regulatory fit in the initial task.  Our second experiment 
extended this investigation to narrative persuasion: if regulatory fit can enhance transportation 
and transportation enhances persuasion via narratives, then regulatory fit could enhance 
persuasion via narratives.  Additionally, it examined a variable that could moderate the effect of 
initial regulatory fit on narrative transportation and persuasion: whether participants get a 
question at the end of the regulatory-fit task about how right the task made them feel.  Previous 
research has found that this question eliminates effects of initial regulatory-fit manipulations on 
subsequent behavior and judgments (Cesario et al., 2004; Vaughn et al., 2010; Vaughn et al., 
2009; Vaughn, Malik, et al., 2006; Vaughn, O’Rourke, et al., 2006), apparently by clearing up 
where this feeling came from.  Results of our second study confirmed these hypotheses: 
participants were more transported and persuaded when they had experienced regulatory fit in 
the initial task, the fit effect on transportation statistically accounted for the fit effect on 
persuasion, and these effects disappeared among participants who received the question about 




The approach we took in this initial research could be extended in many ways.  For 
example, researchers could target experiences of regulatory fit/nonfit more specifically to parts 
of a narrative.  Imagine varying the placement of a commercial that elicits an experience of 
regulatory fit or nonfit (e.g., Cesario et al., 2004; Lee & Aaker, 2004) so it comes before an 
especially plot-intensive versus an especially character-intensive part of a televised program.  
The subjective experience of fit or nonfit from the commercial could carry over to affect the 
level of engagement with the narrative program when it resumes, especially if the commercial is 
not too distracting (Wang & Calder, 2006, 2009; though see Nelson, Meyvis & Galak, 2009).  If 
plot is more important to persuasion via that narrative, then varying regulatory fit just before the 
plot-intensive part could have a greater impact. 
Another way to extend this approach is to examine the impact of fit experiences and 
sources of fluency other than regulatory fit with promotion and prevention.  There are many 
other ways psychological fit can occur (e.g. Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Higgins, Cesario, Hagiwara, 
Spiegel & Pittman, 2010; Hong & Sternthal, 2010; Kim, Rao & Lee, 2009; Lee & Aaker, 2004; 
Mannetti, Giacomantonio, Higgins, Pierro & Kruglanski, 2010; Vaughn, Baumann & Klemann, 
2008).  Research suggests that many – if not all - forms of psychological fit enhance processing 
fluency and, very likely, a desirable sense of rightness or correctness (e.g., Hong & Sternthal, 
2010; Kim et al., 2009; Lee & Aaker, 2004; Vaughn, 2010; also see Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009).  These experiences could affect later judgments if people are not thinking about what 
actually caused the experiences. 
Research also shows that effects of fit and/or fluency are not limited to experiences 
carrying over from an initial event exterior to a later task.  Effects of fit and fluency often come 
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directly from people’s engagement with a focal task (for general reviews, see Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Higgins, 2005, 2006; Reber et al., 2004).  As a result, there are many 
possible manipulations of fit and/or fluency that could affect narrative engagement.  We will 
mention two.  Imagine varying regulatory fit within people’s experience of a story without using 
commercial breaks and with a different self-regulatory orientation than prevention or promotion.  
If you primed participants to think about moving quickly from activity to activity (a 
“locomotion” orientation; Kruglanski et al., 2000), they may be more absorbed and persuaded by 
a filmed narrative shot from lots of camera angles than by exactly the same narrative shot just 
from one angle (cf. Mannetti et al., 2010).  Researchers with a talent for film could try this.   
Something we have done is to vary the ease of processing a written narrative by manipulating the 
contrast of the font in which it is printed (white vs. light gray against a darker-gray background; 
cf. Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007).  If processing fluency enhances engagement with 
a narrative, then participants who receive a story written in easier-to-read, higher-contrast font 
could be more transported.  This effect could be eliminated by giving participants an initial 
question about how easy it is to read the font, which would help them decide the font, not the 
story, is causing their feelings of ease or difficulty.  Preliminary results have supported these 
predictions (Vaughn, Petkova, Hesse, Trudeau & Ozses, 2007). Future research could extend this 
to narrative persuasion. 
Thus far, we have only noted examples of how regulatory fit and/or processing fluency 
could enhance engagement with and persuasion via narratives.  This assumes there is nothing 
wrong with the narrative.  But what if there is – or one perceives that there is?  For example, 
imagine watching a scary movie that’s carrying you along; it’s almost as if you’re with the main 
character as she slowly pieces together that there could be a serial killer in her house.  She hears 
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something in the basement. A storm outside has knocked out the power.  Wearing only her 
underwear and carrying only a lighted match, she slowly descends the creepy stairs to 
investigate.  You squirm and mentally yell, “Don’t go down there!”  (You’re transported!)  But 
suddenly you think, “Hm.  I’m not sure anyone would really go down to that creepy basement in 
just their underwear.”  Now you are not as transported, but you are no less engaged in narrative-
related processing.  You are reality-checking what you see against your understandings of the 
world, a process that is bringing more of yourself and your own thoughts to mind (Buselle & 
Bilandzik, 2008).  These thoughts about your own thoughts are metacognitions, which people 
can hold with more or less confidence (Petty, Brinol, Tormala & Wegener, 2007).  Because you 
feel not entirely confident about your story critical-thought (“I’m not sure…”), you may be more 
likely to re-engage in narrative transportation than if you think: “Hm. I’m sure no one would 
really go down to that creepy basement in just their underwear.”  The confidence of this latter 
metacognition could cause you to have another: “I am so not into this movie.” If so, the 
significance of a narrative subtext (“Don’t go down to the basement alone!”) would probably be 
lost on you. 
Both regulatory fit and processing fluency enhance feelings of confidence (e.g., Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Cesario et al, 2004), and research suggests that confidence from fit or 
fluency can increase engagement with whatever thoughts, feelings, or behavioral tendencies 
people have at the time (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Cesario et al., 2004; Idson, Liberman 
& Higgins, 2004; Vaughn, Malik et al., 2006).  The highly-absorbed, flow-like state of 
transportation would occupy most, if not all, of people’s currently-available attention (e.g., 
Green & Brock, 2002; Slater & Rouner, 2002).  If the most salient thing to someone is the 
guided imagery of the events and characters of a story, regulatory fit and processing fluency 
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could enhance transportation.  However, if someone is questioning the realism of the story, 
regulatory fit or processing fluency could enhance confidence about not being “into” the story, 
making further transportation less likely. 
Our initial research on this hypothesis suggests that regulatory fit and greater processing 
fluency sometimes can reduce transportation relative to nonfit and less processing fluency.  This 
research used stories we knew were not very transporting.  One experiment (Vaughn, 2010) first 
primed regulatory focus by randomly assigning some participants to write about their current 
hopes and aspirations (consistent with promotion focus) and others to write about their current 
duties and obligations (consistent with prevention focus).  Then participants read one of two 
versions of a story about an ancient king who was making a difficult decision about who to select 
as his general (based on Gardner, Gabriel & Hochschild, 2002).  Some participants read a 
version in which the king made a choice that would further his individual hopes and aspirations 
(fit with promotion, nonfit with prevention), and others read a version in which the king made a 
choice that would honor his familial duties and obligations (nonfit with promotion, fit with 
prevention).  Counterinuitively, participants who read a version of this story that fit their primed 
regulatory focus were less transported than those who read a version that did not fit. Another 
experiment (Vaughn et al., 2007) varied processing fluency by manipulating font clarity (white 
vs. gray against a darker-gray background) and had participants read a 106-word short story (J. 
Jaramillo, in Allen, 2006).  Again counterintuitively, participants who read the story in the more 
fluently-processed, white font were less transported than those who read the story in the gray 
font.  Although neither of these studies assessed persuasion via narratives, the positive 
relationship often found between transportation and persuasion suggests that there could be 
similar effects on narrative persuasion.   
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This prediction also is consistent with research on metacognition and persuasion through 
advocacy messages (for reviews see Petty & Brinol, 2008; Petty, Brinol, Tormala & Wegener, 
2007). Advocacy messages are explicitly intended to persuade and are comprised of clear, 
logical and specific arguments.  (They are often found in advertisements, political speeches, and 
journal articles.)  This research shows that people who are more confident about their positive 
thoughts about a message are more persuaded, and that people who are more confident about 
their negative thoughts about a message are less persuaded.  Similar findings have occurred in 
research on regulatory fit and persuasion through advocacy messages (Cesario et al., 2004).  
Recall that regulatory fit enhances thought confidence (Cesario et al., 2004) and processing 
fluency (Lee & Aaker, 2004; Vaughn, 2010).  In one study (Cesario et al., 2004, Experiment 4), 
some participants learned before reading a message that they would be asked how they felt about 
the message itself.  Directing participants to their own thoughts about the message caused 
regulatory fit to enhance persuasion when thoughts about the message were positive and 
decrease it when thoughts about the message were negative.  Future research could assess 
whether similar processes can affect persuasion via narratives.1 
Conclusion 
Although transportation and persuasion via narratives are clearly important phenomena, 
social psychological research on them has been limited.  This may be due to challenges in 
experimental manipulation.  Varying regulatory fit and/or processing fluency is one established 
method that makes it easier to manipulate narrative engagement and persuasion without having 
to vary the often-complex content of individual narratives.  This approach opens new research 
avenues, and it may even help practitioners develop better ways to reach target audiences (e.g., 
to teach morality through Aesop-style fables) and help audiences understand how and when 
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narratives they find entertaining (e.g., the TV show, “24”) could impact their beliefs and attitudes 
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 1 Low narrative transportation could result in less persuasion when – as may usually be 
the case - messages are implied, and using one’s imagination to fill in parts of a story during 
transportation is what lets the story convey a message (e.g., Green & Brock, 2002; Mar & 
Oatley, 2008).  However, if an author includes a set of explicit advocacy statements in a story, 
people may process these arguments as they do other advocacy messages, with stronger 
advocacy arguments resulting in more persuasion if people are more engaged in critical thinking 
(e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  With that said, people tend 
to find advocacy messages inserted into narratives intrusive and to develop negative attitudes 
about these messages (Wang & Calder, 2006, 2009).  Certainly, more research is warranted on 
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